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Chapter 1 
State Formation in Victorian Jamaica 
Diana Paton 
 
When Victoria came to the throne in 1837, Jamaica was at the center of imperial debates 
about empire. Its institutions of government were undergoing substantial change, as 
everyone sought to adapt to the abolition of slavery. Colonial state systems of power in 
the island and on an imperial scale were directed toward controlling a population that 
was in the process of establishing itself as free and toward ensuring the continuing 
extraction of wealth under transformed political and social conditions. If, to frame the 
problem in Marxist terms, the state is the means by which a ruling class projects its 
interests as the interests of the whole of society, it is worth noting that at this 
transitional moment, “society” in Jamaica did not yet include the majority of the 
population. That majority was held in the transitional state of “apprenticeship”: neither 
enslaved nor free. The state did not, in either its imperial or its colonial form, claim to 
embody the interests of the population; rather, the imperial government claimed to 
protect the interests of people who were as yet unable to represent their own interests. 
The distinction is small but significant. 
In the early years after 1837, the political system shifted toward partial inclusion 
of some former slaves in “society.” During this period, representative bodies spoke for a 
broader constituency than before. Those included were men who had become property 
owners or had established the security of rental tenure.1 These men were imagined as 
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embodying the interests of the families they were said to head in a manner analogous to 
how the state was said to embody the interests of the people as a whole. To a limited 
extent, their new free status created a space that allowed some freed people to demand 
that state authorities act in their interests.2 In practice, although electoral campaigns 
solicited the votes of freed people with the implication that legislators would work on 
their behalf, legislators had little power to make change in the interests of the newly 
free., Those possibilities that did exist were largely closed off after the Morant Bay 
rebellion, in 1865. The rebellion was followed by a shift to direct colonial rule in the 
form of Crown Colony government, which entailed the abolition of the elected Jamaican 
Assembly and its replacement with an unelected Legislative Council. This process of 
“de-democratization,” in Mimi Sheller’s terms, was only partially mitigated by the 
addition of elected members to the Legislative Council in 1884.3 As Thomas Holt argues, 
by the late nineteenth century it had been established that “for the colonies, the 
corollary of satisfying economic grievances at the expense of political demands was the 
renunciation of political self-rule in return for economic assistance.”4 In Jamaica, that is, 
the limited social and economic gains of the poor in the late nineteenth century came in 
tandem with, and not necessarily in spite of, political disfranchisement. The experience 
of the postemancipation period was that direct action in the form of rebellion led to a 
decline in direct political power, but, because it also produced a shift in state policy 
designed to prevent further violent confrontation, it brought some social gains. 
By the time Victoria died, in 1901, Jamaica and the wider Caribbean region had 
become marginal to British debates about empire, which were preoccupied with India 
and South Africa and with the new colonies acquired in the late nineteenth century. 
British commentators increasingly understood Jamaica, and the Caribbean more 
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generally, as a drain on imperial resources, rather than as a contributor to imperial 
wealth. Within the colony, political power was organized on a largely unrepresentative 
basis. Nevertheless, some state initiatives, such as the Jamaica International Exhibition 
of 1891 and the associated and subsequent promotion of the island as a destination for 
both tourism and settlement, worked by invoking the interests of the Jamaican people 
as a whole or as a unit within a wider imperial fraternity. The organizers of the 
exhibition believed the “interests” of the people to be embodied in the arrival of white 
settlers, who would be placed above the majority population within Jamaica’s racial 
hierarchy.5 There had been a substantial change in dominant conceptualizations of the 
state’s relationship to the “people,” despite overall continuity in the working of the state 
system. 
We can identify, then, a long-term trend in state formation: from a state 
conceptualized as embodying the interests of a society made up of only a tiny minority 
of the population to one that claimed to represent the people as a whole. Contrary to 
interpretations of the period between the end of slavery and the 1930s as one of 
uniform “neglect,” genuine changes took place during this time.6 Particularly significant, 
and the focus of this chapter, was the moment immediately after the Morant Bay 
rebellion of 1865. This was the third period of revolutionary violence in Jamaica in a 
century, preceded by what Vincent Brown calls the ‘Coromantee War’ of 1760, and by 
the rebellion led by Sam Sharpe in 1831.7 In 1760, 1831, and 1865, popular uprisings 
were put down by extreme state violence. The suppression of each rebellion was 
followed by periods of expansive governmental activity, extending in two apparently 
contradictory directions: repression and protection. In reality these approaches worked 
together to enhance the stability of power relations within Jamaica. 
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After each rebellion, steps were taken to develop the state’s capacity to repress 
opposition: new forms of militia, new police forces, new legal restrictions on enslaved 
people’s activities, and/or new or better organized prisons were put in place. Over a 
slightly longer period, responses to rebellion involved the development of limited legal 
protection or social provision for the majority. Such periods were also characterized by 
intervention by the imperial government and its representatives, the colonial 
governors, who increasingly assumed the advantages of a more systematized and 
bureaucratic state, which they pressed local power holders to accept. Thus, the late 
period of slavery saw the institution of a minimal level of legal protection against abuse 
by slaveholders, as a response both to pressure from the British imperial government  
and to rebellions like Tacky’s and the fear of further rebellions. Sharpe’s rebellion 
helped advance the end of slavery itself. In the period after 1865, Crown Colony 
government was instituted and measures were taken to extend state activity in many 
directions, including health provision and limited land reform. Changes to the less 
directly coercive elements of state activity focused on the provision of education and 
medical services, some public health measures, and modifications to the regimes 
regulating land, family law, and taxation. These measures aimed to incorporate the 
Jamaican majority into society in the hope of creating greater social stability and 
imperial loyalty. The very establishment of an area of encounter between poor 
Jamaicans and state practice that was not primarily coercive was significant in itself. 
The sociologist Philip Abrams argued in 1977 that “the state does not exist”; 
instead, Abrams claims, we should investigate the “state idea” and “state systems.”9 A 
couple of years later and from a different scholarly tradition, Michel Foucault asserted 
that scholars should not “accept a priori the existence of things like the state, society, 
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the sovereign, and subjects” but instead should investigate the working of these terms 
as discursive entities.10 Neither Abrams nor Foucault was thinking about colonial 
contexts, but if anything, in settings like Jamaica “the state” was even more of an 
ideological projection than it was in the metropolis. Its claims to authority required the 
imagining of networks of power projected across large blocks of space and backed up by 
the regular use of violence. Within Jamaica, “the state” was formed through everyday 
encounters at toll gates, in court rooms and schoolrooms, in reformatories and prisons, 
in dispensaries, and on the streets. Such encounters contributed to the racing and 
gendering of the population, the distribution of resources, and the constitution of 
power. Perhaps most importantly, though much less visibly, state formation took place 
through the propagation of norms of property holding and transmission that sustained 
the concentration of land in a few hands while permitting and at times facilitating the 
emergence and reproduction of small-scale landholdings. In examining state formation, 
then, we need to investigate this linked network of everyday practices and embodied 
encounters. We must also attend to the limited but significant processes by which some 
individuals from the Afro-Jamaican majority, who themselves or whose parents or 
grandparents had experienced slavery, came to embody elements of the state system, in 
roles such as police constables, teachers, dispensers (pharmacists), and toll collectors. 
Accepting these premises means focusing on the production of state systems and state 
ideas over time.11 
State formation in Victorian Jamaica can also be viewed as part of the 
development of a network of state activity that was concurrently taking place in other 
colonies and within metropolitan Britain itself. In Britain, this period saw expanding 
concern about public health and sanitation, increased state intervention to regulate 
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working hours and conditions, greater regulation of sexuality, and the expansion or 
founding of institutions such as workhouses, prisons, and reformatories. Much of this 
activity has been interpreted as molding or disciplining subjects in oppressive ways. 
Nevertheless, with present-day attacks on all forms of state regulation of business 
practices in mind, it is worth emphasizing that in metropolitan Britain, increased state 
regulation of, for instance, workplaces and the food supply was in many cases a 
response, at least in part, to popular pressure.12 In Jamaica, as a colonial site, this 
dynamic played out rather differently. As in Britain, state bodies sometimes had to 
respond to popular pressure even when the people had little or no electoral power. 
Black Jamaicans were able to put limited pressure on government through popular 
action such as the antitaxation riots in 1848 and the destruction of toll gates in 
Westmoreland in 1859.13 But in a colony, the direction of state activity was determined 
by many more competing pressures, from the metropolis as well as from within the 
colony. Such external pressures were present in the metropolis but much less dominant. 
Between the end of slavery and the Morant Bay rebellion, the leitmotif of 
discussions about the state in Jamaica was anxiety about spending. Repeated crises 
developed around the alleged need for “retrenchment,” that is, cuts in expenditure—
what would today be described as “austerity.” Between 1838 and 1865, these crises 
were products of the tension between the local elite, as represented by the assembly, 
and the imperial government, represented by the governor. At moments of political 
conflict such as the passage of the imperial West India Prisons Act of 1838 and for 
several years following the passage of the imperial Sugar Duties Act of 1846, the 
assembly either refused to pass bills to pay for state spending or drastically cut amounts 
to be spent.14 Crises over retrenchment took place almost annually in the late 1840s and 
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early 1850s. State spending had to be authorized by annual revenue bills, giving the 
assembly considerable power to disrupt the smooth functioning of state activity. The 
Police Act of 1846, for instance, cut the number of people in the police force almost in 
half, while building work on the new General Penitentiary in Kingston ground to a halt 
in 1849 as a result of the refusal of the assembly to pass a revenue bill authorizing 
taxation.15 In 1851 the colony-wide police force was disbanded in favor of a force 
organized at the parish level, although an island-wide force was reestablished the 
following year.16 State projects that aimed to transform the culture of the Jamaican 
population, such as the provision of schools, tended to stumble on the desire to limit 
spending. 
The Morant Bay rebellion was interpreted in imperial Britain as a sign of the 
problems caused by the Jamaican elite’s approach to colonial government. Crown 
Colony government was established, with Sir John Peter Grant appointed as the first 
new governor after Edward Eyre. Grant’s governorship, from 1866 to 1874, saw 
significant changes in the scope of the Jamaican state’s imagined powers. Under Grant, 
there was still a great deal of concern about finance; indeed, after he took over as 
governor, his early reports emphasized the dire state of Jamaican finances and the need 
to balance the books.17 However, in contrast to his predecessors, Grant’s approach was 
to expand state revenues through duties and taxation rather than to cut expenditure. 
These additional revenues were raised largely by measures that disproportionately 
affected the poor, such as increased duties on rum and the extension of a house tax to all 
except resident estate laborers.18 Grant made only relatively small cuts in spending, 
notably by disestablishing the Church of England. In other ways, too, Grant and his 
immediate successors extended state expenditure, in a period during which, Roy Augier 
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wrote sixty years ago, “the administrative apparatus of a modern state” was 
established.19 
<Fig 1.01 around here> 
Grant’s reforms were a direct response to the Morant Bay rebellion and, in 
particular, to a series of problems that were perceived as its causes: conflict over land, 
lack of trust in the courts, disaffection with local elites. But they were also part of a 
wider pattern of reformulation of state policy that was taking place throughout the 
British Empire and within Britain itself. Across the empire, colonies were establishing 
new police forces, implementing new systems of health care and taking public health 
measures, funding schools for young children, changing laws regarding land tenure to 
try to stimulate capitalist agriculture, and revising taxation to ensure greater funds for 
state projects. Metropolitan Britain also saw a significant growth in state institutions 
and authority in this period, despite official ideologies of laissez-faire.20 In some of these 
measures, Jamaica in the 1860s led the way; in some, Jamaica followed other colonies, 
notably Ireland and India. The Crown Colony system fostered the growth of state 
activity while leaving the people without access to the political system. 
In The Problem of Freedom, Thomas Holt emphasizes the significance of the 
example of Ireland in stimulating colonial policy toward Jamaica in the late nineteenth 
century. Holt argued that a series of influential thinkers and politicians understood the 
“Irish problem” of rural insurgency to be caused by land hunger. The solution proposed 
for Ireland was the redistribution of small plots of land, but not of political power, on 
the understanding that this step would lead to significant reductions in unrest, a form of 
so-called beneficent despotism. Holt argues that this Irish policy was adopted in, and to 
some extent adapted to, late nineteenth-century Jamaica. Holt is right to draw attention 
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to the connection between Jamaican and Irish colonial policies, but also important is 
another, equally significant, set of colonial links, discussed only briefly by Holt: those 
between Jamaica and India.21 
Prior to being appointed as governor of Jamaica, Grant had been lieutenant-
governor of Bengal from 1859 to 1862, after a longer career in the Indian colonial 
service. His posting to Jamaica at this critical point in the colony’s history was based on 
the assumption that his Indian experience made him particularly good for this new role. 
The conservative Earl of Carnarvon, the colonial secretary, wrote to Grant immediately 
after his appointment as governor, emphasizing that “the experience of administrative 
functions which you have obtained during your service in Her Majesty’s Eastern 
possessions . . . will afford you the best guidance in your new field of duty.”22 Grant had 
experience in administering a colony in the aftermath of insurrection, having been at 
the heart of the British effort to reformulate colonial power in Bengal in the wake of the 
1857 rebellion. He was sent from England to Jamaica with instructions to attend to a 
panoply of concerns: poor relief; education; the judicial system; policing; “the 
repression of praedial larceny” (the theft of agricultural produce or livestock from an 
estate or farm); land and its occupation, especially the “problem” of “squatting”; 
taxation; administrative reform; and “the introduction of capital and labour.”23 His 
successor as Jamaican governor, Sir William Grey, was also a former lieutenant-
governor of Bengal. 
In Bengal, Grant had been involved with new policies regarding land, the 
judiciary, policing, education, public health, and the administration of the state. In 
Jamaica, he oversaw similar policies, in particular in relation to land. Grant’s land policy 
in Bengal had restrained the absolute power of landowners by enforcing commercial 
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laws. The Bengal Rent Act of 1859 also facilitated the increase of rents charged on 
peasant farmers who held their land under customary agreements.24 His Jamaican 
policy was similarly oriented toward the promotion of commercial agriculture. Several 
new laws passed in 1867 combined to enable the Crown to repossess land held by big 
planters but not used productively. In both India and Jamaica, then, Grant faced hostility 
from some major landowners, who perceived him as too favorable to the local peasants. 
Grant’s sympathy was, in reality, for relatively successful peasant landholders along 
with productive planters, and he accompanied it with attacks on those who made a 
living through more marginal means. The most dramatic and immediate effect of Grant’s 
land policy was the eviction of “squatters”—many of whom had substantive legal claims 
to their lands—which took place on a significant scale in the late 1860s and early 
1870s.25 Grant’s governorship also saw a major change in the law of trespass, following 
a campaign by large landowners who complained of unjustified peasant suits about the 
trespass of livestock on their land. The new law shifted responsibility for fencing land 
against livestock disturbance from the owner of the animals to the owner of the arable 
land, preventing such suits and revealing the limits of Grant’s sympathy for peasant 
farmers.26 
Grant’s approach to land policy is illustrated by his intervention in a conflict over 
landownership between a large landowner and small settlers at the Hartlands estate, 
near Spanish Town. The case indicates the complexity of relations around land in 
postemancipation Jamaica. Hartlands had, according to those living there, been sold off 
in small plots by its owner, Mr. Hart, in the early years after emancipation, but the 
purchasers had no written title to the land they worked. Some of those resident may 
well not have paid for the land but still felt entitled to it on the basis of the labor that 
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they had put into it. In the 1860s another Mr. Hart, the son of the original seller, wanted 
to “resume possession” of what Grant described as an “abandoned” estate. In March 
1866, before Grant’s arrival in Jamaica, Hart acquired a court order to enable the land to 
be surveyed. The residents resisted the surveying party but were forced to accede to it 
when Acting Governor Storks sent a force of 150 soldiers to back up the police. The 
settlers backed down but managed to secure a series of meetings between their 
representatives, Hart, and Storks himself, which (at least according to their later 
testimony) resulted in a promise to establish a process of independent adjudication. 
Soon after Grant’s arrival, however, Hart managed to get an eviction order from the 
regular court. The settlers petitioned Grant, noting their grievances, but his reply 
ignored the content of their complaints, stating instead that “the petitioners may be 
quite certain that whatever force of police, and, if necessary, of military, is required to 
support the law will be employed, and that all who unlawfully resist will be 
apprehended and punished with the utmost severity of law.”27 The case echoed the 
transition that Grant had overseen in India toward enforcing a system of land that 
required written titles. 
The Hartlands case illustrates the connections among Grant’s multiple policies. 
His report on the incident emphasized the need for a stronger police force, a conclusion 
that was also drawn from the Morant Bay rebellion. Although the Hartlands settlers 
were successfully repressed, Grant was concerned to discover that very few policemen 
were available for this suppression. His experience with the Hartlands dispute bolstered 
his case for his initial focus on security. In 1867 he founded the Jamaica Constabulary 
Force, a new paramilitary police force modeled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. The 
new force required considerable additional resources, costing around £40,000 a year, 
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significantly more than the £25,000 annual expenditure on the old Jamaican police.28 
Grant and his successors introduced a series of other security-focused innovations, 
many of them concerned with the problem of the so-called habitual criminal. People 
identified as such were registered after 1870 and routinely photographed after 1873.29 
He also merged some prisons into larger institutions, closing the county jail in Kingston, 
for instance, and transferring the prisoners there to the equivalent jail in Spanish 
Town.30 
Grant also oversaw changes to the court system, reorganizing the old courts into 
new district courts and introducing many more salaried judges trained in the United 
Kingdom. The stated purpose of the new court system was to make the courts more 
accessible to the population, especially for civil matters, and to remove them from the 
control of the local plantocratic magistracy.31 These reforms also had the effect of 
making the judiciary more centralized and more dependent on metropolitan education 
and experience, a characteristic move of Crown Colony rule. In addition, the boys’ and 
girls’ reformatories, both of which had been established by private charitable 
organizations in the 1850s, were expanded under Grant’s governorship (see Shani 
Roper’s discussion in chapter 5).32 
Grant’s governorship also saw significant changes in the areas of both curative 
medicine and public health. In these areas, too, he was influenced by his Indian 
experience, with public health a major concern in his last years as a civil servant. The 
Royal Commission into the Sanitary State of the Army in India, known as the Sanitary 
Commission, sat from 1859 and reported in 1863. Although the commission was 
primarily concerned with military health and medicine, stemming from security 
concerns about the prevalence of disease among British troops that had limited their 
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ability to suppress the 1857 rebellion, its recommendations had important 
consequences for the organization of public health throughout India.33 Grant arrived in 
Jamaica with similar concerns about the health of the population. He created the Central 
Board of Health to oversee new parish-level local boards of health, which were 
responsible for improving local sanitary systems.34 His government established 
compulsory vaccination of children for smallpox, following British policy, which had 
introduced compulsory vaccination in 1853.35 In line with policy around the British 
Empire at the time, he opened a lock hospital, which treated venereal disease, to confine 
women said to be prostitutes.36 Grant also established a system in which district 
medical officers were appointed for regions across Jamaica, an innovation that took 
place before the equivalent position was created in Britain.37 The district medical 
officers received a salary, in exchange for which they were responsible for providing 
free medical care to those deemed to be “indigent.” They could supplement this income 
with private practice but were required to treat people who could not afford full fees at 
reduced rates.38 This system was in 1875 organized into the more centralized Island 
Medical Service. Given their relatively small budgets, the medical services introduced by 
Grant inevitably reached a relatively small proportion of the population. Furthermore, 
to the extent that government-paid doctors did treat poor Jamaican patients, their 
understanding of that work was framed by interpretations of medical care that were 
dismissive of or hostile to popular Jamaican treatment practices and explanations for ill-
health. Such confrontational rather than cooperative approaches must have made the 
care that European doctors were able to offer less effective than it might otherwise have 
been. Yet at the same time, the establishment of the district medical officers made a 
claim that was largely new: that the state should take responsibility for the health of the 
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population. This view was not simply about preventing suffering; it was infused with a 
sense of the population as a labor resource that must be safeguarded for the benefit of 
planters and other potential employers, and, ultimately, for the benefit of the imperial 
economy. 
The early period of Crown Colony government also saw significant changes in 
family law. In 1869 the legislature passed a maintenance law, making parents of 
“illegitimate” children financially responsible for their children to the same extent as 
parents of children born to married parents. Although posed as being about parents, 
this law was in fact directed at fathers. Grant argued that it would remove a 
counterincentive to marriage, assuming that low rates of marriage derived from men’s 
reluctance to take responsibility for their children.39 During the tenure of Grant’s 
successor, Sir William Grey, a good deal of additional family-related legislation was 
passed, dealing with marriage, divorce, and the registration of children and their 
maintenance.40 These shifts in family law, like changes to the system of public health, 
implicitly asserted the inclusion of poor Jamaicans in “society.” The new legal 
arrangements recognized the difference between Jamaican and middle-class British 
family forms (through the extension of responsibility to the “illegitimate”) but retained 
the assumption of the superiority of British norms. 
Historian James Patterson Smith has noted the “racial reasoning” that underlay 
many of Grant’s policies and in particular his overall assumption that centralized and 
unelected Crown Colony government was necessary for the Caribbean. Black Jamaicans, 
Grant claimed, were “ill-suited” for self-government because they possessed “not one 
Anglo-Saxon characteristic.”41 But he also justified Crown Colony rule on the basis of the 
limitations of the white planter class. To him, the Morant Bay rebellion demonstrated 
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the failure of their government, just as the 1857 Rebellion in India indicated the failure 
of Company rule (direct government by the East India Company). In both cases, a more 
centralized form of government was now necessary. Without autocracy, Grant believed, 
the reforms necessary to develop colonial societies and secure them against popular 
discontent could not be implemented. His policies, and those of his successors in Crown 
Colony government, created significant changes in the nature of the Jamaican state. 
Even though the shift to Crown Colony government decisively declared that Jamaicans 
could not represent themselves through electoral politics, the development of new state 
activities in the second half of the Victorian period, especially medical services and 
public health provisions, and shifts in family law suggested a different way of 
conceptualizing the relationship between government and population. A new form of 
colonial community was in the making. 
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